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Abstract 
Often the high level of unemployment in Germany is explained by a lack 
of flexibility, over-regulation in the labour market and disincentives of the 
social security system. However, these institutional effects are difficult to 
test by means of data from only one country. Cross-country comparisons 
are hindered by the availability of comparable datasets, especially at the 
establishment level. 
The comparative analysis of labour markets with different degrees of 
flexibility, regulation, and social security systems will show the importance 
of these institutions for the mobility of individuals. In this paper we will 
estimate regressions – almost identically specified – using establishment 
datasets from Germany and the Netherlands. We do not only analyse the 
process of hiring and firing, but also the extent to which they occur simul-
taneously. Churning can be regarded as the part of hiring which occurs 
above the level of replacement of separations. 
Our results show that German establishments have significantly lower 
churning rates than their Dutch counterparts. To some extent this can be 
explained by a different economic situation and a different age-structure 
of the working population. Important labour market institutions exerting 
some influence on churning appear to be: the share of fixed term con-
tracts in total employment (higher in the Netherlands), the German ap-
prenticeship system, and the German works councils. 
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1 Introduction 
In the last two decades much attention has been paid to the relation be-
tween labour market institutions and labour market performance (Free-
man 2002; Jackman et al. 1995). Important elements are the role of un-
ions, works councils and wage bargaining regimes (OECD 1997; Rogers 
and Streeck 1995), and employment protections regulations (Abraham 
and Houseman 1993; Mayes and Soteri 1994; Nicoletti et al. 1999; OECD 
1999). In international comparisons Germany and the Netherlands are of-
ten located in the same category (the so-called Rhineland-model). Never-
theless, there are several differences in institutions between both coun-
tries (CPB 1997). 
Often the high level of unemployment in Germany is explained by a lack 
of flexibility, over-regulation in the labour market and disincentives of the 
social security system. However, these institutional effects are difficult to 
test by means of data from only one country. Cross-country comparisons 
are hindered by the availability of comparable datasets, especially at the 
establishment level (Bellmann and Promberger 2004).  
Different institutions offer distinct opportunities for the mobility of indi-
viduals and may affect the personnel policy of firms. Therefore, the com-
parative analysis of labour markets with different degrees of flexibility, 
regulation, and social security systems will show the importance of these 
institutions for the mobility of individuals.  
In this paper we will estimate regressions – almost identically specified – 
using establishment datasets from Germany and the Netherlands. In con-
trast to individual data, information from establishment data allow us to 
analyse not only the process of hiring and firing, but also the extent to 
which hires and separations occur simultaneously. While the net flow of 
workers in establishments reflects more their economic situation, churning 
is often an instrument for readjusting the workforce. We would like to 
show that - although the latter is also affected by the economic situation - 
the institutional framework with (national) specific regulations has its own 
influence on employer and employee decision making.  
We focus our comparison of churning in both countries on several per-
spectives: on the national context of disposable data and different scales 
of measurement as well as on probably different meanings of institutions, 
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and adequate ways in which variables can be constructed and interpreted. 
Therefore the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe 
some German and Dutch labour market characteristics and the institutions 
that are relevant for our topic. Section 3 discusses the concept of churning 
and presents basic labour market flow statistics. In section 4 we formulate 
a number of hypotheses, explain how the data for both countries are con-
structed, and conclude to what extent the hypotheses are confirmed by 
the results of a multivariate analysis. Section 5 completes the paper with 
conclusions. 
2 The German and Dutch labour markets and  
labour market institutions 
Labour market situation and composition of the workforce 
Before describing differences in labour market institutions between both 
countries, we pay some attention to general labour market characteristics 
in 1998/99, the years on which our analysis is based1. Table  shows the 
employment growth rate, the unemployment rates and the employment 
rates (defined as employment / population ratios) in both countries in our 
observation period. 
Table 1: Employment growth, unemployment and employment rates in Ger-
many and the Netherlands in 1998 and 1999  
Germany Netherlands 
1998 1999 1998 1999 
employment growth rate 1.6 2.9 
unemployment rate:     
Total 9.3 8.7 4.4 3.6 
< 25 9.0 8.2 8.8 7.4 
25 – 55 8.4 7.8 3.7 3.0 
> 55 14.7 14.4 2.3 2.7 
employment rate:     
Total 64.7 65.4 69.4 70.9 
< 25 46.7 47.7 60.3 62.7 
25 – 55 78.0 79.0 79.3 80.6 
> 55 38.4 38.0 33.0 35.3 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2000, Statistical Annex 
 
                                                 
1 The IAB-data relate to the first half of 1999, the OSA-data to the year 1998. 
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The unemployment rate in Germany is more than twice as high as in the 
Netherlands. For the youngest age group the unemployment rate is more 
or less comparable between both countries, but the Dutch employment 
rate is higher. For workers older than 25 years the picture changes and 
the largest difference becomes apparent for older workers. 
In Germany the unemployment rate was approximately 15 percent2 for 
this category, compared to less than three percent in the Netherlands. 
Apart from the overall low unemployment rate in the Netherlands, this 
large difference can partly be explained by institutional factors. 
The Netherlands has a combination of a low unemployment rate as well as 
a low employment rate for older workers, caused by an easy access to the 
disability system and generous early retirement schemes3. An additional 
explanation of the relatively high Dutch employment rates (and probably 
also for the low unemployment rates) is the high share of part-time jobs, 
especially for women. In the Netherlands 55 percent of the female work-
ers has a part-time job, compared to 33 percent in Germany.  
This first comparison between the workforce in both countries shows eco-
nomic as well as structural differences. The economic situation in the 
Netherlands was better, i.e. a stronger growth of employment and a low 
unemployment rate. More structural differences become visible in the em-
ployment rates. The high share of part-time employment in the Nether-
lands plays a part in it, but more important for our topic seems to be the 
age composition of the workforce. Germany has a higher participation rate 
of older workers and therefore the share of older workers in the total 
workforce is significantly higher than in the Netherlands, a fact we also 
observe in our data (see summary statistics in the Appendix A). 
Apart from differences in the (un)employment situation and the age com-
position of the workforce, there are some additional differences in the 
                                                 
2 Later in our analysis we will restrict our German data to establishments from former 
Western Germany. There, the unemployment rate is for any age group lower than in 
Eastern Germany. Because of different concepts of measurement in Germany and the 
OECD, it is not possible to present figures only for Western Germany which are also 
comparable to the Dutch ones. 
3 The trend of declining participation rates of Dutch older workers reversed in the sec-
ond half of the nineties. 
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country-specific labour market institutions. We pay attention to at least 
four aspects in the institutional framework of Germany and the Nether-
lands. 
Fixed term contracts 
In 1997 a study was published by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis (CPB) about differences in economic institutions between 
Germany and the Netherlands (CPB 1997). It states that the relative 
number of fixed term contracts (FTC) was ten percent in Germany (stable) 
and twelve percent in the Netherlands (rising). At first sight the difference 
seems to be small, but the effect of apprentices is substantial. In Germany 
almost half (45 percent) of total FTC is related to apprentices. In the 
Dutch case apprentices are only a small minority in the total number of 
FTC. Thus FTC as an instrument for labour market flexibility (excluding 
apprentices) seems to be more wide-spread in the Netherlands. 
The apprenticeship system 
Although apprentices have a fixed term contract, it is important to stress 
their special position, especially in Germany. The status of the apprentice-
ship system is different in both countries. In Germany it is a highly valued 
form of vocational education and training. After completing the appren-
ticeship training a person is regarded as a skilled worker. It is often guar-
anteed by collective agreement that German apprentices have the right to 
work at least for one year after finishing the apprenticeship training in the 
same firm4. In the Netherlands, the dual system is in practice a possibility 
for young people with little learning abilities to get a vocational education 
(Frietman and Hövels 1994). In general they do not have a protected po-
sition after finishing the apprenticeship training. 
Worker protection 
In Germany, worker protection is often influenced by the strength of 
workers representation (works council) in establishments5. In small firms 
                                                 
4 See Bellmann (1999) for details. 
5 See for detailed theoretical and empirical descriptions of the German system of indus-
trial relations with data from the IAB-Establishment-Panel: Addison et al. (2002) or 
Addison et al. (2004). The set-up of a works council is guaranteed by law, if the ma-
jority of employees votes for it in the specific plant, but up to 20 employees their in-
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(less than 5 workers) works councils cannot be introduced in the institu-
tional framework of Germany and workers cannot appeal in court against 
social cases of hardship if they are dismissed. So there is an important 
difference in employment protection between small and large firms. In the 
Netherlands prior admission of the regional employment office is required 
for dismissals (which is in practice not very restrictive), and works coun-
cils are usually not involved. They can only give advice in case of mass 
dismissals.  
Short-time work is another difference between the two countries. It is 
much more important in Germany. In the Netherlands, there is a strict 
rule for this government-financed labour hoarding, and its use is rather 
rare. In Germany, short time working allowances are available to keep 
employees from being laid off. It does not only apply to overcome tempo-
rary difficulties, but to prevent or postpone dismissals in case of structural 
adjustment difficulties, too. It corresponds with the German focus on com-
mitment within long-term labour relationships. 
Co-determination 
Co-determination may cause a more sluggish decision-making. Frick 
(1996) has shown that the presence of works councils significantly lowers 
both quit and dismissal rates in German companies. German works coun-
cils are influential regarding social or personnel policies and have not only 
an impact on separations. In the Dutch system of co-determination, es-
tablishments with 35 workers or more are obliged to have a works council. 
Workers in establishments with ten to 35 workers can have only advisory 
personnel meetings, but surely not in a comparable, especially institution-
alised manner as in Germany.  
Though institutions for co-determination are similar to some extent, in the 
German system the workers influence on personnel policies seems to be 
stronger for at least three reasons. First, the absence of a works council in 
smaller Dutch establishments. Second, in case of dismissals the German 
works councils have advisory rights, whereas in the Netherlands the re-
gional employment office determines whether individual dismissals are 
                                                                                                                                                        
fluence on personnel policies is rather limited. Only in plants with more than 20 em-
ployees the works council must subscribe to hires and separations. 
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appropriate. In case of mass dismissals, German works councils play an 
important role. They cooperate with the regional institution, which is re-
sponsible for labour market activities (the Landesarbeitsamt). In the 
Netherlands only trade unions negotiate about social plans. Third, in Ger-
many works councils have a stronger legal base. All-in-all the stronger po-
sition of German works councils (often in combination with collective 
agreements) may lead to more insider power. 
National regulations by law with respect to dismissals and the strength of 
worker representation in the firm (unions or works councils) protect the 
position of the existing workforce in a plant (the insiders), but make the 
allocation of human resources more sluggish. At the sector level or the 
national level a reallocation of workers is often regarded as advantageous. 
If workers or employers find a better match elsewhere it leads to higher 
productivity and higher economic growth. A typical quantitative indicator 
for the reallocation of workers is the churning rate, which is calculated 
from the hiring and separation rates on the plant level. 
3 Worker mobility in Germany and the Nether-
lands 
3.1 The churning concept 
The concept of churning is based on the evidence that worker flows on the 
plant or establishment level6 are higher than needed for adjusting the 
employment to its desired level. Often there is the underlying assumption 
that churning can be interpreted as one expression of the equilibrium phe-
nomenon when employers and employees make new judgements of their 
job matches (Davis and Haltiwanger 1999; Burgess, Lane and Stevens 
2000). Churning itself describes the part of worker mobility which cannot 
be expressed by the net flow of workers. If for example an employer has 
10 workers and the desired level is eleven, he can just hire one extra 
worker. The hiring rate and the net growth (job flow) rate is ten percent, 
and there is no churning. However, if two workers quit then three new 
workers must be hired to achieve the desired level of eleven. In this case 
the extra flow of workers consists of two separations plus two additional 
                                                 
6 We use plant and establishment as synonyms. 
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tional hires. These four extra flows correspond to a churning rate of 40 
percent. Of course it is also possible that the two separations are no quits, 
but dismissals because of a change in required skills or for other reasons. 
Flows into and out of temporary jobs are also important determinants of 
churning.  
In many cases the flow of workers will exceed the flow of jobs, which may 
arise from the side of workers (quitting and being replaced) or from the 
employer's side (dismissing workers and replacing them by others). As the 
analysis of churning is typically from the point of view of the firm, it is an 
important question to what extent the employer can influence quitting. In 
principle, as slavery is abolished in developed countries, employers cannot 
prevent their workers from quitting. However, to some extent they can try 
to influence the quitting of individual workers by their wage policy or by 
making the workplace more or less attractive in a subtle way. Burgess, 
Lane and Stevens (2001) argue that the employer can influence the quit 
rate, mainly by paying higher or lower wages. But this seems to be not 
convincing in general, especially in European countries where wage struc-
tures are rather rigid. Higher wages for individual workers to prevent 
them from quitting are probably less common than in the US. Workers 
might quit for several other reasons than their wages; sometimes for per-
sonal reasons, like retirement, child birth, the impossibility of a change in 
working hours at their current employer, a shorter commuting time, or 
moving with the partner to another region or country. In other cases they 
might quit for better job prospects. Better prospects are a dominant mo-
tive for job mobility, especially for younger people in general. In particular 
the mobility of workers could be – regardless the age – depend also on 
the size of an establishment: for small plants it is often impossible to cre-
ate an attractive career prospect for their employees.  
The empirical framework to formalise the concept of churning starts with 
the difference between the flow of workers WF (hires + separations) and 
the flow of jobs JF (change in number of employed workers).  
(1) WF = H + S  
(2) JF = | H - S |   
(3) C = WF - JF 
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Division by the (average) number of workers gives the flow rates WFR, 
JFR and CR. 
From equations (1) to (3) it follows that: 
(4) C = 2*S  if  H > S   
(5) C = 2*H if  S > H  
Depending on the time period it frequently happens that labour market 
flow data include many zero observations. Probably the most frequent ca-
se, especially in small establishments, is that of stable employment 
without any hires or separations (H=S=0). The shorter the observed time 
period, the greater the probability of such a situation. Also in cases of a 
growth or decline in employment the churning rate can be zero; a suffi-
cient condition is zero separations (H>S=0) or zero hires (S>H=0). 
In all other cases the churning rate is positive. If the number of hires and 
separations are equal at positive values (H=S>0), the assumption seems 
justified that hires are in most cases caused by the separations (replacing 
quitted, fired or retired workers). In the case of a growing aggregate em-
ployment the frequency of H>S>0 will be higher than the frequency of 
S>H>0. Hence, we can conclude that a major part of churning is caused 
by separations. This means for our comparative study that we can expect 
a significant influence on the churning rate of institutional restrictions on 
separations.  
3.2 Labour market flow statistics 
After defining the relationship between hires, separations and churning in 
the last section, we illustrate this by the data for our analysis. For practi-
cal reasons, we use data for 1998/1999 (see for more details section 4.2). 
Table 2 presents all possible combinations of hires and separations in 
combination with growth rates at establishment level and the average es-
tablishment size7. 
                                                 
7 All descriptive results are weighted. They represent typical establishments in both 
countries. 
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Table 2 shows that the aggregate churning rate is significantly lower in 
Germany than in the Netherlands8. A further difference between the es-
tablishments in both countries is the size structure. Dutch establishments 
are on average much smaller than German establishments. The cases 
without any flow (H=S=0) are concentrated in Germany as well as in the 
Netherlands in small establishments. 
Table 2: Churning and combinations of hires and separations in German and 
Dutch establishments 
IAB 1999
condition cases (%) churning rate growth rate  average size
H=S=0 664 (20) 0 0 27
H>S=0 286 (8) 0 28.6 91
S>H=0 535 (16) 0 -17.4 236
H=S>0 439 (13) 31.3 0 151
H>S>0 711 (21) 20.6 8.7 611
S>H>0 774 (23) 15.6 -8.0 948
total 3406 (100) 11.9 -0.5 411
OSA 1998
condition cases (%) churning rate growth rate average size
H=S=0 204 (11) 0 0 13
H>S=0 187 (10) 0 17.0 19
S>H=0   84  ( 5) 0 -14.1 39
H=S>0 324 (17) 27.9 0 91
H>S>0 697 (37) 22.3 8.5 313
S>H>0 363 (20)  17.9 -6.6 342
total 1859 (100)   16.7  3.0 205
 
Sources: IAB-Establishment-Panel 1999, OSA-Panel 1998 
 
A striking difference is the average size of the zero-churning category 
S>H=0. In the Netherlands 93 per cent of this category have less than 
100 workers. In Germany this is 65 per cent, whilst five percent of this 
category have more than 1000 workers9. So, it is no exception that large 
German establishments contract without hiring new workers. 
                                                 
8 The original German data from the IAB-panel relate to the first half of 1999. They 
were transformed to a yearly basis (see Appendix E). 
9 55 percent of all establishments with more than 1000 workers have more separations 
than hires and a positive churning rate (S>H>0). Eight  percent of the plants with 
more than 1000 workers have only separations with a zero churning rate (S>H=0). 
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Furthermore, the IAB data show a higher frequency of H=S=0, which had 
been expected given the shorter time period10. But also the frequency of 
S>H=0 is higher in German data and causes a main part of the difference 
in the aggregated employment growth. This difference in employment 
growth is reflected on the other hand by the high frequency of H>S>0 in 
the Dutch data. 
The described (national specific) differences in growth of employment re-
lated to the extent and relation of hires and separations show the impor-
tant role they play in the concept of churning. For this reason we include 
in our analysis not only the churning rate, but also the hiring and separa-
tion rates (see Appendix B and C).  
A basic characteristic of the churning concept is that higher churning rates 
are often related to more separations in growing establishments and more 
hires in contracting establishments. A first glance at hires and separations 
can be given by different groups of employment growth rates of estab-
lishments (Figure 1a and 1b). 
For almost all growth classes of employment Dutch hiring and separation 
rates have higher values. The most obvious exceptions are classes with a 
positive growth of 15 per cent or more. In case of contracting employment 
the Dutch hiring rates are higher than the German, which means that the 
reallocation of workers is less hampered by contraction. In case of a posi-
tive employment growth separation rates between the countries do not 
differ too much if all growth classes are taken together.  
The differences between the German and Dutch flows can also be illus-
trated from a slightly different point of view. In the Dutch data 81 per cent 
of the establishments with a negative growth have new hires. In the Ger-
man data it is no more than 62 per cent. On the other hand 78 per cent of 
the expanding German establishments have a positive separation rate. In 
the Dutch case it is nearly the same with 79 per cent. 
                                                 
10 The frequencies for Germany are based on the first half year of 1999; for the Nether-
lands on a full year. 
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Figure 1a: Separation rates by growth of establishments in Germany and the 
Netherlands 
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Figure 1b: Hiring rates by growth of establishments in Germany and the Neth-
erlands 
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Sources: OSA-Panel 1999, IAB-Establishment-Panel 1999 
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Finally, we present the churning rates by size classes and industries (Ta-
ble 3). We distinguish between five size classes and eight sectors.  
Table 3: Churning rates in Germany (1999) and the Netherlands (1998) 
 Germany Netherlands 
Total 11.9 16.7 
Size:   
5-19 11.6 21.1 
20-99 12.5 16.8 
100-199 12.3 14.4 
200-499 13.1 14.3 
500 and more 10.3 14.3 
Sector   
Agriculture, fishery and mining   7.6 12.3 
Processing of food, textile and wood 10.3 17.5 
Other manufacturing   9.0 14.7 
Construction 12.5 15.4 
Private services 14.7 20.4 
Education 18.1 10.3 
Government   5.5 10.5 
Health care and other public services 12.5 18.6 
Sources: IAB-Establishment-Panel 1999, OSA-Panel 1998/1999 
 
In almost all cases the churning rates in German establishments are lower 
than the Dutch rates, only the education sector being an exception. This 
can be explained by specific Dutch institutions in this sector that discour-
age labour mobility and give teachers with a permanent contract a pro-
tected position. Hence, Dutch teachers have also a high job stability on 
the individual level11. Apart from this special case and the overall lower 
churning levels in Germany, differences between the sectors are roughly 
the same in both countries: the highest churning rates are in private ser-
vices and the lowest in the government sector.  
4 Determinants of churning in both countries 
In this part we will investigate the determinants of churning in both coun-
tries. We start – with regard to comparable information in both country-
specific datasets - with the hypotheses. In the next part of section four we 
give some information about the way in which slightly differing variables 
are made comparable. Afterwards we turn to the results. 
                                                 
11 In Germany these persons are mostly integrated in the public service sector while the 
German education sector in the sector classification of the IAB Establishment Panel re-
flects more private ownerships. 
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4.1 Hypotheses 
Age-structure  
In section 3 we noticed that young people change jobs more frequently. 
Consequently, a higher proportion of young employees in a plant makes a 
readjustment of the workforce (defined as churning) more likely, more or 
less independent from the growth of employment (at the establishment 
level). In the middle age group (workers aged between 30 and fifty) we 
assume that job prospects and job matching are dominant motives for 
mobility of employees. The empirical results will show whether the mobil-
ity for middle aged employees is higher than for younger workers (Nether-
lands). In Germany the middle aged employees should have a higher mo-
bility than the younger ones. It should reflect the effect of the German 
apprenticeship system. On the other hand, less opportunities to find bet-
ter job matches (i.e. a high unemployment rate) could reduce the mobility 
of middle aged employees. The resulting effect is from a theoretical point 
of view not clear. For older workers it is more difficult to find another job, 
because their accumulated human capital is often firm-specific. New de-
velopments in technology (especially information and telecommunication, 
ITC) can lead to obsolescence of skills. In this case, employers might in-
vest less in vocational training of older employees. But on the other hand 
separation and transaction costs for separating older employees with long 
job tenures are relatively high12. On balance we expect lower churning ra-
tes with a higher share of older workers. 
Gender composition 
In many cases, women have a less stable position in the labour market, 
maybe because of changes in family responsibilities. Child birth can be a 
reason for a period of non-participation (which is still frequently the case 
in Germany) or for reducing the working hours, which is often realised by 
a change of employer (which is frequently the case in the Netherlands). 
We expect a higher churning rate if the share of female workers is higher. 
                                                 
12 Sometimes these costs can be delegated to the social security system (for details in 
Germany see Beckmann, 2001). 
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Collective agreements and works councils 
Theoretical assumptions were made in Section 2. We expect for both vari-
ables a restriction of churning in both countries. We explained why espe-
cially the effect of works councils should be stronger in Germany.  
Investment in skills and firm-specific human capital 
If the investment in human capital is more firm-specific, this will reduce 
the mobility of workers. As stated in section 2, in Germany the appren-
ticeship system is very important for acquiring skills. Although a major 
part of these skills is general, they have also a firm-specific component. 
Therefore, we can expect that more apprentices in an establishment will 
reduce labour turnover. In the Netherlands, where the apprenticeship sys-
tem is less important, other forms of on-the-job-training may have the 
same effect.  
Technological change 
Technological developments can lead to a mismatch in skill composition. 
Skills may become (economically) obsolete (De Grip et al. 2002) and 
sometimes not all existing workers are able to acquire more up-to-date 
skills. Dynamics in technology and market conditions can be an important 
source for churning (Beckmann and Bellmann 2000; Bellmann and Boeri 
1998; Bellmann and Kölling 1997). In general, adjustments of the work-
force take place in the form of upgrading, which means replacing low-
skilled workers by more skilled workers. This process is stimulated by 
changing skill requirements at the demand side of the labour market, as 
well as a higher supply of skilled workers (resulting from a better educa-
tion and qualification system).  
Qualification level and adjustment costs 
If churning is more costly for the employer, the churning rate will be 
lower. However, as explained in section 3.1, employers cannot prevent 
workers from quitting so that the role of adjustment costs may be limited. 
Nevertheless, as  the costs of hiring and firing are lower for low-skilled 
workers, we expect a negative relation between the churning rate and the 
proportion of low-skilled or low-educated workers. 
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Wages 
The relationship between wages and the readjustment process is complex. 
Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2001) argued that the employer can influence 
the quit rate by paying higher or lower wages (see Section 3.1), which 
should result in a negative relationship between churning and wages. But 
in the European context the wage differentials are smaller and probably 
more stable, so that the effect of wages on the churning rate may be 
weaker. An opposite effect may occur in tight labour markets that encour-
age job mobility of high-skilled, high-paid workers13. Hence, the outcome 
for this variable in the analysis we leave at the moment open.  
Unemployment 
The argument of tight labour markets leads us to the possible effects of 
the labour market situation. On the one hand we know that low unem-
ployment rates and tight labour markets stimulate job mobility. On the 
other hand high unemployment rates can be linked with the restructuring 
of the economy and the labour market. But we may expect that the first 
effect has more influence than the second, so that lower unemployment 
rates are related to higher churning rates. 
Other co-variables 
The importance of fixed-term contracts (FTC) for hires, separation and 
churning seems obvious: more FTC means higher churning rates. In the 
analysis we also control for size and industry14. 
4.2 Standardisation and contents of datasets 
For our analysis we use data of the IAB (German) and OSA (Dutch) estab-
lishment panel15. Representing all economic sectors, these two panels 
provide comparable information on a great number of variables. One dif-
ference is that the OSA-panel does not include establishments with less 
                                                 
13 For our purpose the Dutch case of tight labour markets is especially relevant, and 
most labour shortages were for skilled workers. 
14 We use size and sector dummies similar constructed like in Table 2. 
15 See Kölling (2000) or Bellmann (2002) for additional information about the IAB-
Establishment-Panel. See Fouarge et al. (2001) for the OSA-Panel. Information from 
the OSA-panel on labour market flows is presented in Allaart et al. (2000) and Allaart 
and De Voogd-Hamelink (2001). 
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than 5 workers. For making both panels comparable, this category was 
dropped from the IAB data. Another selection was made by restricting the 
German data to former West-Germany16. 
In the OSA-data the information about the age structure is directly ob-
tained from the panel. For the German data, information of the age struc-
ture was added to the panel from the official employment statistic regis-
ter17. In our analysis we use dummy-variables for the share of employees 
aged below 20, 20-30, 30-40 and 50 and older, and take the latter as ref-
erence group. The gender composition is equally available in both data 
sets. 
Available information regarding institutional aspects include the relevance 
of collective labour agreements and the presence of a works council. The-
se variables are fully comparable in both data sets. 
For collective agreements we use a dummy variable indicating that the 
establishment applies a bargaining agreement either from the sector level 
or from the firm level (1=yes; 0=no). For the works council a dummy-
variable is used, too (yes=1; 0=no). 
For the investment in skills and firm-specific human capital we use for 
both countries the number of apprentices (as a percentage of the total 
workforce). Since the apprenticeship system plays in the Netherlands only 
a minor role, we add from the OSA-data a variable that indicates the im-
portance of on-the-job-training (1=important; 0=not important). In the 
German data there is in 1999 no comparable variable for on-the-job-
training applicable. 
Both panels provide information about technology aspects. In the OSA 
panel a variable can be constructed representing the impact of newly in-
troduced technology (by the share of the workforce working with it). In 
the IAB-Panel we can observe whether an establishment invests in infor-
mation and communication technology (1=yes; 0=no). 
                                                 
16 We exclude plants with in- and outsourcing activities, too 
17 The linking of data from the IAB-Establishment-Panel and the Federal Employment 
Statistic Register is described in Bellmann, Bender and Kölling (2002). 
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For the share of low-skilled workers, the definition is slightly different be-
tween the two countries. In the German case it reflects the share of un-
skilled workers and in the Dutch case it is the share of workers with a low 
education18. 
Another variable which differs slightly is the average wage. From the 
German data it is calculated by the total wage bill in June (divided by the 
number of workers), and in the Dutch case the calculation is based on the 
frequencies of workers over eight wage classes (obtained directly from the 
questionnaire). We use in our analysis the average wage per worker. In 
the OSA-panel this is based on full-time equivalents. In the IAB-
establishment panel the split up for employees concerning their working 
time in weekly worked hours is possible. We use for the German data full-
time equivalents19. 
Since we use cross section data we cannot estimate the effect of the un-
employment rate from an aggregate variable. However, an indication may 
be given by regional differences, and we add the regional unemployment 
rates as an additional variable. In the (West) German regions the rates 
vary between 6.4 and 11.7 percent, in the Dutch regions between 3.9 and 
7.8 percent. 
The relative number of fixed term contracts (excluding apprenticeships) is 
available in both panels. The categorisation in five size classes and eight 
sectors is similar to that in Table 3. We interpret results with reference to 
the smallest size class (five to 20 employees) and the manufacturing sec-
tor20. 
Descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Appendix A.  
                                                 
18 Most, but not all of German unskilled workers have a low educational level, too. 
19 Part-time employees working more than 24 hours weekly have the factor 0.75, be-
tween 24 and 15 hours 0.5, and below 15 hours 0.25. 
20 The sector "Processing food, textile and wood" is separated from the rest of manufac-
turing and represents an own category. 
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4.3 Econometric results 
Since there are many zero-observations in our flow data, we apply a tobit-
estimation (Greene 2003: 962 f.). A one-sided censored tobit model can 
be formalised as  
y*i = βx' i + m i, 
with x' i  as the vector of variables  as described in the last sub-section, m I 
as the error term and 
 y*
 {
i   if    0 < y*i < 1 
yi  = 
  0     if    y*i  ≤ 0  
as our dependant variable, churning. Taking into account the results from 
section 3.2., which show different structures of hires and separations in 
both countries, we used all variables for modelling churning also in similar 
estimations of hires and separations. The results for churning are shown in 
Table 4. The results for tobit-estimations of hires and separations are pre-
sented in Appendix B. Appendix C shows results for a probit estimation of 
separations yes / no. Sometimes we refer to these appendices in the fol-
lowing discussion of the results for churning21.  
The (expected) influence of fixed term contracts (FTC) is obvious. Parts of 
FTC are not extended or transformed into permanent contracts, which re-
sults in a higher turnover rate. 
The implementation of new technologies has no significant impact on 
churning and hiring rates in both countries. However, in the Netherlands it 
has a positive impact on separations, and in some alternative model speci-
fications (with less variables) also on churning. But, all-in-all the indica-
tions for ‘creative destruction’-effects are weak in our investigation. 
                                                 
21 The results for the regressions with the dichotome dependant variable for hires yes/no seem to be 
less interesting. They are similar in both countries and reflect the results of the estimation in Table 
4. Please contact authors for the results of this regression. We see this result as a justification of 
what was said at the end of section 3.1.: churning is more a result from separations than of hires. 
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Table 4: Tobit-estimates of churning rates 
ßi t-value ßi t-value
proportion of  females 0,01 0,37 0,059* 1,67
proportion of  fixed-term-contracts 0,42*** 4,38 0,439*** 4,96
collective agreement -3,66** -2,11 -5,376** -2,39
work council -4,42** -2,36 -0,654 -0,38
proportion of  unqualified workers 0,11*** 3,77 -0,008 -0,30
proportion of  apprenticeships -0,43*** -2,82 0,137 1,46
on-the-job-training important n.a. n.a. -3,981*** -3,02
Investment in new technology (ITC) 1,097 0,73 3,800 1,36
wage per capita (log) -4,38** -2,24 5,423 1,45
unemployment rate -0,41* -1,68 -2,141*** -3,16
proportion of  employees aged
below 20 0,01 0,05 0,502*** 3,70
20-30 0,30*** 3,72 0,247*** 3,93
30-40 0,09 1,26 0,126** 1,99
40-50 0,00 0,03 0,060 0,80
controlling for size and sectors
constant 15,2 0,84 -38,4 -1,14
overall chi-square-test
wald-chi-square (degrees of freedom)
censored observations
observations 
n.a. : not applicable
161,67***
1240
2857
*, **, *** show significance on a level of α < 0.1, α < 0.05, α < 0.01
yes*** yes***
Germany Netherlands
99,7***
396
263,25*** (25)296,13*** (24)
1454
 
Sources: IAB-Establishment-Panel 1999, OSA-Panel 1999 
 
In Germany the percentage of females is not related with churning, but in 
the Netherlands it is significant positive for the churning and separation 
rate. So, the hypothesis of a higher churning rate is confirmed to some 
extent by the Dutch but not by the German results. Possible explanations 
are related to differences in ways of designing family phases and the con-
nected entries into and exits out of the labour market (see also section 
4.1). 
Differences in (regional) unemployment rates affect churning clearer in 
the Netherlands than in Germany. In a tighter labour market (lower un-
employment) the churning rate is higher. This confirms our hypothesis 
that higher job mobility in better economic times dominates restructuring 
effects in bad times. This is especially reflected in the Dutch case where 
hiring as well as separation rates are higher. In the German case only the 
hiring rate is higher with lower unemployment rates.  
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The effect of the age structure of the workforce is partly different between 
the two countries. In the Netherlands there is an almost linear relation-
ship: the older the workforce, the lower the churning rate. In Germany 
the churning rate is only significantly higher with higher proportions of 
employees aged 20 to 30. A higher share of employees between 30 to 40 
years old is only weakly correlated with a higher churning rate. However, 
for this age group the positive correlation with hires is even stronger than 
in the Netherlands. The main difference between the two countries is the 
relation between the age structure and the number of separations. In 
Germany there is no significant correlation, which reflects the stronger 
commitment to long term relationships and the institutions, which mainly 
protect insiders.  
In the German case the flows for the youngest category (less than 20 
years old) do not differ significantly from the oldest age category. Proba-
bly this is related to the apprenticeship system and the opportunities they 
offer for young people for their integration in the labour market. If in the 
Netherlands employees younger than 20 years work in a plant, it is very 
likely that they have a relatively low educational level. In the German sys-
tem such people are very often apprentices, even when problems arise22.  
The assumed relationship between the mobility of young workers and the 
apprenticeship system is supported by the effect of the share of appren-
tices in the workforce. A higher proportion of apprentices in a plant is 
correlated with a lower churning rate in Germany, confirming our 
hypothesis. In the Netherlands this correlation is positive, although not 
significant. It is the institutional framework for integrating young people in 
the labour market, which is responsible for different (optimal) strategies 
of organizing long-term skill demand. Such a strategy should in general 
reduce churning. In German establishments apprenticeship training is an 
important instrument, in the Netherlands this aspect is reflected by the 
importance of on-the-job training. 
Also as expected, labour market institution like works councils and collec-
tive agreements tend to limit churning rates. The negative impact of col-
                                                 
22 In this case subsidies and other supports exist for those individuals to become skilled 
workers anyway. 
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lective agreements is more or less the same in both countries. The hy-
pothesis that in Germany the works councils have a stronger negative im-
pact on hiring, separation and churning rates is confirmed by the analysis. 
In the Dutch case this variable is not significant. 
The influence of wages shows an obvious difference between the coun-
tries. The wage per capita has in Germany a negative influence on churn-
ing. The hypothesis that the employer can influence job mobility by paying 
higher or lower wages seems to be confirmed. But in the Netherlands the 
correlation is positive, though not significant. A possible explanation was 
also mentioned in the hypotheses: tight labour markets may have stimu-
lated the mobility of workers in the upper labour market segment.  
Finally, the hypothesis that lower adjustment costs for hiring and firing 
the lower qualified or educated workers are related to a higher churning 
rate is confirmed for Germany, but not for the Netherlands. A possible ex-
planation for this unexpected Dutch result is the same as for wages: tight 
labour markets may have an equalising effect on job mobility of workers 
in the lower and the upper segments of the labour market. 
A quantitative overview of differences between the two countries is given 
in Appendix D, where an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is presented 
(Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973). The decomposition makes clear that the dif-
ferences in coefficients between the countries are dominating in explaining 
the differences in (predicted) churning rates. The only exception is that for 
fixed term contracts the coefficient is almost equal and the different effect 
on the churning rate is due to a higher proportion of these contracts in the 
Netherlands. The decomposition also shows the very dominating influence 
of the wage variable.  
5 Conclusions 
In a wider international context, Germany and the Netherlands have more 
or less comparable labour market institutions. Nevertheless there are so-
me differences that count. Our analysis points out that these differences 
are important factors in explaining differences in labour market flexibility. 
German establishments have significantly lower churning rates than their 
Dutch counterparts. To some extent this can be explained by a different 
economic situation and a different age-structure of the working popula-
tion. For the years of our analysis (1998/1999) the German unemploy-
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ment rate was relatively high, whereas the Netherlands can be character-
ised by low unemployment and a tight labour market. Regarding the age-
structure it is the higher share of older workers in Germany that contrib-
utes to a lower churning rate. 
Important labour market institutions exerting some influence on churning 
appear to be: the share of fixed term contracts in total employment (hig-
her in the Netherlands), the German apprenticeship system, and the Ger-
man works councils. In all cases these differences contribute to a lower 
German churning rate. In general we can state that the position of insid-
ers receive stronger protection in Germany than in the Netherlands, which 
makes the German labour market less flexible. The judgement whether 
this is a good or bad thing needs some nuances. The job stabilising effect 
for the youngest age group of the German apprenticeship system may be 
regarded as more positive than a strong protection of insiders by works 
councils. 
The different effect of the unemployment rate (stronger in the Nether-
lands) can on itself be seen as a flexibility indicator. On an aggregate (na-
tional) level it can be interpreted as a better ability to adapt or react to 
changing market conditions.  Some questions are not yet solved. The dif-
ferent results for the average wage and for the lower qualified workers 
remain a bit puzzling. We assume that the Dutch results are caused by the 
tight labour market, but there may be other explanations. Further re-
search with data from years with a more balanced labour market situation 
can possibly help to answer such questions. 
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Appendix 
 
 
A Summary statistics for variables in OSA- and IAB**-Establishment-Panel-Data 
obs. mean stand.dev. obs. mean stand.dev.
churning rate 3406 11,87 20,20 1859 16,73 17,91
seperations in percent 3406 10,47 14,07 1859 10,29 10,99
hirings in percent 3406 10,01 16,58 1859 13,27 12,84
proportion of  fixed-term-contracts 3386 4,21 9,25 1859 6,75 10,27
Investment in new technology (ITC) 3406 0,62 0,49 1859 0,08 0,28
proportion of  females 3400 41,10 28,82 1837 47,34 32,75
unemployment rate 3406 9,29 2,73 1859 4,94 0,85
proportion of  apprenticeships 3406 4,99 7,67 1847 3,39 8,69
on the job training important n.a. n.a. n.a. 1859 0,67 0,47
collective agreement 3405 0,74 0,44 1858 0,91 0,28
works council 3358 0,55 0,50 1859 0,69 0,46
wage per capita (log) 3021 8,32 0,48 1638 8,25 0,27
proportion of  unqualified workers 3406 27,85 27,40 1623 36,84 32,21
proportion of  employees aged
below 20 3290 5,13 7,89 1780 3,08 8,21
20-30 3290 21,33 14,41 1780 22,73 18,29
30-40 3290 29,23 12,74 1780 30,56 14,94
40-50 3290 23,81 12,06 1780 27,34 15,99
50 and older (reference) 3290 20,51 13,90 1780 16,28 13,49
establishment size 
5 - 19 employees (reference) 3406 0,29 0,45 1859 0,36 0,48
20 - 99 employees 3406 0,28 0,45 1859 0,28 0,45
100 - 199 employees 3406 0,11 0,31 1859 0,13 0,34
200 - 499 employees 3406 0,14 0,35 1859 0,11 0,31
500 and more employees 3406 0,19 0,39 1859 0,11 0,3
sectors
agrar/ mining 3406 0,03 0,17 1859 0,04 0,2
food/textiles/ wood 3406 0,08 0,27 1859 0,05 0,22
other manufacturing (reference) 3406 0,24 0,42 1859 0,11 0,31
construction 3406 0,07 0,26 1859 0,06 0,25
private services 3406 0,32 0,47 1859 0,25 0,43
education 3406 0,15 0,36 1859 0,09 0,29
government 3406 0,01 0,11 1859 0,07 0,25
other public services incl. health care 3406 0,08 0,27 1859 0,33 0,47
Germany* Netherlands
* plants in West Germany with at least five employees
n.a. : not applicable       stand.dev. : standard deviation
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B Tobit-estimation of hiring and separation rates 
(hires and separations as a proportion of total employment) 
ßi t-value ßi t-value ßi t-value ßi t-value
proportion of  females -0,02 -0,92 0,02 1,04 0,03 1,23 0,036* 1,82
proportion of  fixed-term-contracts 0,43*** 5,68 0,19*** 3,26 0,37*** 6,21 0,25*** 4,80
collective agreement -4,72*** -3,53 -1,70* -1,75 -2,79* -2,03 -2,67** -2,00
works council -2,66** -1,99 -2,95*** -2,93 -0,11 -0,11 -1,07 -1,08
proportion of  unqualified workers 0,02 1,02 0,06*** 3,68 -0,01 -0,75 -0,02 -1,08
proportion of  apprenticeships -0,48*** -4,39 -0,03 -0,31 0,00 -0,01 0,07 1,16
on-the-job-training important n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -1,83** -2,23 -2,05*** -2,70
Investment in new technology (ITC) 0,97 0,91 0,23 0,28 0,36 0,25 2,67* 1,80
wage per capita (log) -2,61* -1,88 -3,07*** -2,70 2,69 1,20 2,50 1,22
unemployment rate -0,41** -2,48 0,11 0,83 -0,99** -2,02 -1,02*** -2,88
proportion of  employees aged
below 20 0,10 0,99 0,01 0,15 0,33*** 4,36 0,27*** 3,50
20-30 0,22*** 3,88 0,07 1,59 0,22*** 5,89 0,08** 2,26
30-40 0,20*** 3,54 0,03 0,83 0,11*** 2,89 0,07* 1,84
40-50 -0,01 -0,17 0,01 0,30 0,06 1,34 0,02 0,41
controlling for size and sectors
constant 15,9 1,26 23,8** 2,27 -16,7 -0,82 -13,6 -0,73
chi-square-test
wald-chi-square (degrees of freedom)
censored observations
observations 
n.a. : not applicable
*, **, *** show significance on a level of α < 0.1, α < 0.05, α < 0.01
82,2***
330
1454
34,8***
238
1454
104,9*** 119,1***
993
yes***
2857
793
2857
202,34*** (24) 138,01*** (24) 262,13*** (25) 192,72*** (25)
yes***
Germany
hires seperations
Netherlands
hires seperations
yes***yes***
 
 
C Determinants of separations in German and Dutch establishments 1999 
(heteroscedasticy consistent probit estimation with separations=yes=1; no=0) 
ßi t-value ßi t-value
proportion of  females 0,003 0,25 0,004* 1,79
proportion of  fixed-term-contracts 0,004 0,12 0,015** 2,19
collective agreement -0,074*** -11,06 -0,388** -2,53
work council -0,004 -0,05 0,19** 1,99
proportion of  unqualified workers 0,002** 1,97 0,000 0,1
proportion of  apprenticeships 0,001 0,43 0,005 0,94
on-the-job-training important - - -0,149 -1,44
Investment in new technology (ITC) 0,051 0,8 0,160 1,05
wage per capita (log) -0,056 -0,77 0,514** 2,41
unemployment rate -0,007 -0,68 -0,079 -1,66
proportion of  employees aged
below 20 -0,002 -0,55 0,021*** 2,79
20-30 0,003 1,2 0,008** 2,08
30-40 0,003 1,09 0,006 1,71
40-50 0,006 0,23 0,005 1,28
controlling for size and sectors
constant 0,11 0,89 -3,69* -1,93
chi-square-test
pseudo r²
observations 
*, **, *** show significance on a level of α < 0.1,  α < 0. 05, α < 0. 01
yes
2871 1210****
0,28 0,21
187,1*** 94,6***
Germany Netherlands
yes
 
Sources: OSA-Panel 1998/ 1999 , IAB-Establishment-Panel 1999 
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D Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of Table 4a
 
proportion of females 0,022 40,81 0,066 46,35 -2,16128 -0,12188 -2,0394
fixed-term-contracts 0,44 4,21 0,447 6,65 -1,12015 -1,0736 -0,04655
collective agreement -3,664 0,74 -5,388 0,91 2,19172 0,62288 1,56884
work council -4,764 0,55 -0,629 0,67 -2,19877 0,57168 -2,77045
apprenticeships -0,576 5,05 0,141 3,39 -3,38679 -0,95616 -2,43063
wage per capita -6,176 8,32 6,649 8,26 -106,30506 -0,37056 -105,9345
unemployment -0,472 9,23 -2,2 4,94 6,51144 -2,02488 8,53632
below 20 0,034 5,23 0,495 2,93 -1,27253 0,0782 -1,35073
20-30 0,29 21,28 0,242 22,85 0,6415 -0,4553 1,0968
30-40 0,079 29,33 0,128 30,74 -1,61765 -0,11139 -1,50626
40-50 -0,004 23,68 0,063 27,31 -1,81525 0,01452 -1,82977
Total -110,53282 -3,82649 -106,70633
100% 3,46% 96,54%
Dβ Dx Nlβ Nlx )( NlDD xx −β )( NlDNlx ββ −NlNlDD xx ββ −
 
 
a The variables „proportion of unqualified workers” and “ investment in new technology” are eliminated because of differences in 
definitions between the two countries. Therefore the coefficients differ from those in Table 4. 
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E From half-yearly to yearly figures 
The original German flow data from the annual establishment-panel are 
limited to the first half year of 1999, whilst the Dutch data cover a whole 
year (1998). To take this into account we multiplied the German hires and 
separations times two and controlled the results with the job flows from 
administrative data. 
After this multiplication for the German data of hires and separations a 
match better than 95 percent with the administrative data job flows could 
be reached in 53% of establishments, of course mostly in establishments 
with no job flows. For another 40 percent the variation in the results are 
more or less acceptable (see below for reasons of variation). Approximate-
ly ten percent of German plants have no hires and separations in the first, 
but the second half of the year. We assume that this effect on the chur-
ning rate per year is compensated by establishments with positive chur-
ning rate in the first half and zero-rates in the second half of the year. 
Furthermore, the administrative source contain „only“ hires and separati-
ons from employees related to social security while in the IAB-
Establishment-Panel separations and hires can be analysed also for 
employees which are not related to the social security system. This is also 
an explanation for differences in the results for both sources. We’d like to 
thank Stefan Bender from the Institute for Employment Research for the-
se (monthly based) flow data from administrative sources which enables 
us to accomplish this comparison. 
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